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CHAPTER ONE 
 
“ANOINTING POWER WITH PIETY”1: 
PEOPLE POWER, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
 
Raul C. Pangalangan 2 
 
 
 
The ouster of Philippine President Estrada was peaceful though barely 
constitutional, but for a careful patchwork of legal arguments.  Is the “People Power” 
overthrow of unwanted leaders a step forward in “democratic experimentalism”, or a step 
backward for the rule of law so instrumental in constraining business and feudal elites? 
 
The classic tension between constitutionalism and the raw power of mass struggles 
finds a fresh setting in the downfall of President Joseph Estrada (hereinafter, “Erap”), 
following civilian protests coupled with passive military support and induced economic 
paralysis.  What is the place of law in democratic governance, in a newly restored 
democracy where political institutions are weak, business elites strong, and the Church 
even stronger?  What is the role of constitutions in political transitions? 
 
I. Organization 
The current Philippine Constitution was the fruit of the first “People Power” 
revolution led by Cory Aquino which ousted the Marcos regime in February 1986 
(hereinafter, EDSA 1, named after the major road in Metro Manila where the protests 
converged) through a peaceful uprising which relied upon the moral indignation of a 
concerned citizenry.  After EDSA 1, the Philippines constitutionalized “people power”, the 
direct but peaceful exercise of the will of the sovereign people.  The second “People 
Power” (hereinafter, EDSA 2) led to the ouster of President Erap by Gloria Macapagal-
                                                 
1 ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS (1990). 
Arroyo in January 2001.  In May 2001, Erap’s supporters, typically poor and uneducated, 
converged on EDSA and marched to the presidential palace, asking for their hero’s return 
(hereinafter, EDSA 3), committing acts of violence which compelled Arroyo to declare a 
“state of rebellion.”3 
 
In this paper, first, I will situate EDSA 2 within the constitutional history of the 
Philippines, more specifically, vis-à-vis the virtually bloodless transition from the Marcos 
regime to Cory Aquino’s democracy; second, I will examine the factual and constitutional 
framework for EDSA 2; and third, I will look at the implications of EDSA 2 for the future 
of democratic and rule-based governance in the Philippines. 
 
II. Brief Constitutional History 
A. Malolos Constitution 
Philippine Constitutional history has bifurcated beginnings.  One line begins and 
ends with the Malolos Constitution of 1899 4 , which established a parliamentary 
government with an express bill of rights.  The Malolos charter was adopted during that 
brief interval in early 1899 between the triumph of our revolution for independence against 
Spain, and the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, and subsequently, the continuation 
of the Philippine war of independence, this time against the United States, in the 
Philippine-American War.5 
 
B. U.S. “organic acts” 
The other line begins with the “organic acts” by which the triumphant U.S. forces 
governed the “new territories”, e.g., Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, starting with 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 Dean and Professor of Law, University of the Philippines.  A.B. cum laude in Political Science (1978), LL.B. 
(1983), University of the Philippines; LL.M. (1986), S.J.D. (1990), Harvard Law School. 
3 Proclamation No. 38, Declaring a State of Rebellion in the National Capital Region (1 May 2001). 
4 THE LAWS OF THE FIRST PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC (THE LAWS OF MALOLOS, 1898-1899) (Sulpicio Guevara, ed., 
National Historical Institute, Manila, 1972) at 88. 
5 CESAR A. MAJUL, THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS OF THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (Univ. of 
the Philippines, Quezon City, 1967). 
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President William McKinley’s famous Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission6 
(as commander-in-chief), the subsequent executive and legislative “charters” for the 
Philippine Islands, culminating with the 1916 Jones Law which allowed the colony to write 
its own constitution in preparation for independence.  The most significant characteristic of 
these organic acts were express guarantees of rights to the natives, and the creation of 
institutions for representative government. 
 
C. 1935 Constitution 
Accordingly, the 1935 Constitution was drafted by Filipinos and, as required, 
approved by the U.S. Congress.  It was a faithful copy of the U.S. Constitution, with a 
tripartite separation of powers and, again, an express bill of rights.  The 1935 Constitution 
is the charter that was in force the longest, from 1935 until 1973 when it was “killed” after 
Marcos declared martial law.  By that time, that Constitution had provided a textbook 
example of liberal democracy: periodic elections for the president and a bicameral 
congress; a vigorous free press; a free market, hortatory clauses on social justice for the 
poor and disadvantaged.  Its biggest challenge came from the social ferment and the student 
movement of the mid-1960s, articulated by the campus Left, a straightforward critique of 
the legal fictions of the liberal state. 
 
D. 1973 Constitution 
 Marcos, then on his second and last term as President, initiated the re-drafting of the 
1935 Constitution.  Beset by Left-inspired student protests and by a countryside Maoist 
rebellion, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus in 19717 and altogether declared martial 
law in 1972.8  By January 1973, a tired but pliant nation approved the new Constitution9, 
changing our presidential into a parliamentary government and which provided a transition 
period that allowed Marcos to concentrate powers in himself. 
                                                 
6 VICENTE V. MENDOZA, FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON 
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (Central Lawbook, Quezon City, 1978), at 65. 
7 Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. L-33964, 42 SCRA 448 (11 December 1971). 
8 Proclamation No. 1081, Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines (21 September 1972). 
9 Proclamation 1102, Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the 1973 Constitution (17 January 
1973). 
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 The bogus ratification of the 1973 Constitution was challenged before the Supreme 
Court.  In Javellana v. Executive Secretary10, the Court found that that the Constitution had 
not been ratified according to the rules but that the people had acquiesced to it.  What the 
rules required was the approval by the people in a plebiscite wherein voters cast their 
ballots.  What Marcos arranged was for a mere show of hands in so-called “peoples’ 
assemblies”, where people were supposedly asked: “Do you approve of the new 
Constitution?  Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?”.  
The people allegedly having acquiesced to the new government, the Supreme Court 
declared it a political question and stated: “There is no further judicial obstacle to the new 
Constitution being considered in full force and effect.”  The sovereign people is the fount 
of all authority, and once the people have spoken, the Courts are not in a position to 
second-guess that judgment. 
 
Regardless of the modality of [ratification] – even if it deviates from … the old 
Constitution, once the new Constitution is ratified … by the people, the Court is 
precluded from inquiring into the validity of those acts.  (Makasiar, separate 
opinion) 
 
If they had risen up in arms and by force deposed the then existing government … 
there could not be the least doubt that their act would be political and not subject to 
judicial review.  We do not see any difference if no force had been resorted to and 
the people, in defiance of the existing Constitution but peacefully… ordained a new 
Constitution.  (Makalintal and Castro, separate opinion) (emphases supplied) 
 
In 1976, Marcos had this 1973 Constitution amended making him a one-man 
legislature, and in 1981, he fully “constitutionalized” his government by further amending 
the Constitution and declaring a “new” republic altogether11. 
                                                 
10 G.R. No. 36142, 50 SCRA 30 (31 March 1973). 
11 Proclamation No. 2045, Proclaiming the Termination of the State of Martial Law (17 January 1981). 
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  On 21 August 1983, Ninoy Aquino was executed upon landing at the Manila 
International Airport and his death triggered off nationwide indignation.  In October 1985, 
yielding to international pressure caused by his human rights record, Marcos called for 
special elections on 7 February 1986 to get a fresh mandate.  Declaring that he intended to 
resign the presidency before his term was over12, he asked the parliament to pass a law 
calling for “snap elections.” 13   Ninoy’s widow, Cory, ran against him and, despite 
overwhelming support, was cheated of victory.  What ensued is what we now call the 
EDSA Revolution. 
 
E. Cory’s Freedom Constitution 
 Marcos fled to exile in Honolulu, Cory took her oath, and no sooner promulgated 
her “Freedom Constitution”14 by “direct mandate of the sovereign Filipino people.”  The 
Supreme Court, in the Freedom Constitution cases15, held that she drew her legitimacy 
from outside the constitution, and that all challenges raised political and non-justiceable 
questions. 
 
The Freedom Constitution was the interim charter by which the Philippines was 
governed between February 1986 (EDSA 1) and February 1987 (when the present 
Constitution was adopted). The Court recognized however that Cory Aquino became 
President “in violation of [the] Constitution” as expressly declared by the Marcos-
dominated parliament of that time (i.e., the Batasang Pambansa) and was “revolutionary in 
the sense that it came into existence in defiance of existing legal processes.”16   Thus the 
                                                 
12 Letter from President Ferdinand E. Marcos to Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa Nicanor E. Yñiguez and 
other Members of the Parliament (11 November 1985). 
13 Batas Pambansa Bilang 883, An Act Calling a Special Election for President and Vice-President (Snap 
Elections of 1986) (3 December 1985).  See also Philippine Bar Association v. Commission on Eelections, 
G.R. No. 72915, 140 SCRA 453 (19 December 1985) (setting aside legal objections to the “snap elections”, 
characterizing the matter as a political question, and declaring “the elections are on”). 
14 Proclamation No. 3, Promulgating a Freedom Constitution (25 March 1986). 
15 Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 73748 (22 May 1986); In re 
Saturnino Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180, 145 SCRA 160 (24 October 1986); De Leon v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 
78059, 153 SCRA 602 (31 August 1987); and Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, A.M. No. 90-11-
2697-CA, 210 SCRA 589 (29 June 1992). 
16 Letter of Justice Puno, supra. 
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Court stated that the people having accepted the Cory Government, and Cory being in 
effective control of the entire country, its legitimacy was “not a justiceable matter [but] 
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people … are the judge.”17 
 
F. The current 1987 Constitution 
 In January 1987, a new Constitution – written by an appointive (by Cory Aquino) 
Constitutional Commission – was ratified by the nation18, and which continues to govern, 
unrevised, until today. 
 
III. Institutionalization of “Direct Democracy” after EDSA 1 
The current Constitution is the fruit of the first “People Power” revolution led by 
Cory Aquino and reflects the values that animated EDSA 1. It embodied a long list of 
“directive principles” and welfare state clauses, but it also contained a strong Bill of Rights, 
detailed guarantees against a Marcos-style power-grab, and restored the checks-and-
balances among three separate branches of government, including an independent Human 
Rights Commission.  Finally, it institutionalized the direct exercise of democracy through 
“peoples’ initiatives” to recall officials and propose laws and charter amendments.  It was 
as if the Constitution first listed all the things that the state had to do for the people; then 
reminded the state of the many things it couldn’t do to the people; and, the state thus 
paralyzed, allowed the state to be eternally second-guessed and subverted by the people. 
 
 The 1987 Constitution “institutionalized people power”19 and the Supreme Court 
has since “rhapsodized people power” 20  in several cases where the “direct initiative” 
clauses of the Constitution had been invoked.  These clauses allow direct initiative for the 
following: 
 
                                                 
17 Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines, supra. 
18  Proclamation No. 58, Proclaiming the Ratification of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the 
Philippines (February 1987). 
19 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections, 26 September 1996. 
20 Defensor-Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 19 March 1997 (hereinafter, PIRMA I). 
 6
(a) To propose or repeal national and local laws;21 
(b) To recall local government officials, and propose or repeal local laws;22 and 
(c) To propose amendments to the Constitution.23 
 
The Congress has passed implementing laws, which have been applied, tested and 
affirmed before the Supreme Court.  The Local Government Code24 provided for the recall 
of local officials by either the direct call of the voters, or through “preparatory recall 
assembly” consisting of local government officials, which was hailed by the Supreme Court 
as an “innovative attempt … to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people 
of their sovereign power.”25 
The Congress has also enacted the Initiative and Referendum Act (hereinafter, the 
Initiative Law)26, which provided for three systems of initiative, namely, to amend the 
Constitution; to propose, revise or reject statutes; and to propose, revise or reject local 
legislation.  In a case involving the creation and scope of a special economic zone created 
out of Subic Bay, a former U.S. military base27, the Supreme Court hailed the Initiative 
Law as “actualizing [] direct sovereignty” and “expressly recogniz[ed the people’s] residual 
and sovereign authority to ordain legislation directly through the concepts and processes of 
initiative and of referendum.” 
 
IV. A Bogus People’s Initiative to Amend the Constitution 
The first wrinkle on this neat constitutional framework appeared in 1997, when then 
President Fidel Ramos (Cory Aquino’s successor), through willing cohorts, tried to amend 
                                                 
21 Const., art. VI, sec. 32. (“a system of initiative and referendum … whereby the people can directly propose 
or enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof [upon] a petition therefor signed by at least 
ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented 
by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof”). 
22 Const., art. X, sec. 3 (“a local government code … with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and 
referendum”). 
23 Const., art. XVII, sec. 2 (“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be 
represented by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein …). 
24 Republic Act No. 7160. 
25 Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 5 October 1993. 
26 Republic Act No. 6753. 
27 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v.Commission on Elections, 26 September 1996. 
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the Constitution to lift term limits which banned him from remaining in office after his term 
ended in 1998. In what has been called the “acid test of democratic consolidation”28, he was 
rebuffed by the Supreme Court, following protests by people who saw a dark reminder of a 
similar maneuver by Marcos which led to the death of Philippine democracy in 1972.  
Since the proposal was politically unpopular, a shadowy private group called the People’s 
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA or, literally translated to Filipino, 
“signature”) instead launched a signature campaign asking for that constitutional 
amendment, invoking the direct initiative law.  That attempt was rejected twice by the 
Supreme Court29, which went to great lengths to say that the direct initiative clauses of the 
Constitution were not self-executory; that they thus required congressional implementation; 
and that Congress’s response, i.e., the Initiative Law, was “inadequate”– notwithstanding 
that it expressly referred to constitutional amendments – and thus cannot be relied upon by 
PIRMA. 
 
A dissenting opinion found this “a strained interpretation … to defeat the intent” of 
the law.  Another dissent stated: “It took only one million people to stage a peaceful 
revolution at [EDSA 1 but] PIRMA …claim[s] that they have gathered six million 
signatures.”  The majority, however, pierced through the legalistic arguments and saw the 
sinister politics lurking behind.  Then Justice Davide (now Chief Justice) said that the Court 
must not “allow itself to be the unwitting villain in the farce surrounding a demand 
disguised as that of the people [and] to be used as a legitimizing tool for those who wish to 
perpetuate themselves in power.”  Another justice said that PIRMA had “cloak[ed] its 
adherents in sanctimonious populist garb.” 
 
But if the PIRMA cases showed the limits of direct democracy, EDSA 2 re-affirmed 
its power.  
                                                 
28  Jose V. Abueva, Philippine Democratization and the Consolidation of Democracy Since the 1986 
Revolutionn: An Overview of the Main Issues, Trends and Prospects, in DEMOCRATIZATION: PHILIPPINE 
PERSPECTIVES (Felipe B. Miranda, ed., Univ. of the Philippines Press, 1997), at 22. 
29 Defensor-Santiago v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 127325 (19 March 1997); People’s Initiative for 
Reform, Modernization and Action v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129754 (23 September 1997) (both 
cases hereinafter cited as the PIRMA cases). 
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 V. Factual Framework of EDSA 2 
The next test of People Power came with the barely constitutional ouster in January 
2001 of President Joseph Estrada through what we now call EDSA 2. 
 
1. Erap was unbeatable politically (i.e., through elections) and could only be unseated 
legally (i.e., by conviction for impeachable offenses). 
 
In May 1998, Erap , a movie actor, was elected President by direct vote of the 
people, winning by the largest margin in Philippine history.  The poor dearly loved the man 
for his movies, where he often played the underdog, fighting with his fists to save the 
downtrodden, hence his campaign mantra “Erap for the Poor.”  His vices were openly 
known: several mistresses and families, gambling and drinking, often way into the morning 
with buddies with shady reputations.  He won despite the understandable revulsion of the 
Catholic clergy.  The business elite, aghast at Erap’s unprofessional working style (e.g., 
policy reversals during midnight drinking sprees) and favoritism for cronies, couldn’t wait 
for the next presidential polls in 2004 when Erap, limited to a single six-year term, would 
step down. 
Then in August 2000, a gambling buddy, now fallen from grace, linked Erap to a 
nationwide network of gambling lords who gave him illegal payoffs laundered through the 
banking system.  How else, it was asked, could he have paid for his mistresses’ lavish 
lifestyles?  However, under the Philippine Constitution, Erap could be replaced only by 
impeachment, or resignation. It was thought that Erap could not be impeached, because he 
held the numbers among the congressmen (around 250, one-third of whom had to vote for 
impeachment) and the senators (24, two-thirds of whom had to vote for removal). 
 
2. Despite his enduring popularity with the masses, Erap was unseated by a loose 
coalition of business, Church, student and “civil society” groups, including Cory Aquino’s 
“pro-democracy” legions.  The voice of the people, uttered through elections, was 
overwhelmed by the voice of the people, spoken through mass protests. 
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 By mid-November 2000, enough congressmen had deserted Erap due to public 
protests, and the Congress hastily approved the articles of impeachment.  A high profile 
trial ensued before the Senate. It was to be the showcase for the rule of law, the high and 
mighty brought to heel before the majesty of law.  Yet the Senators (who by law sat as 
jurors in the trial) and the public were often impatient with technical debates on the 
admissibility of evidence (“legal gobbledygook”, a Senator said), often due to the hasty 
drafting of the articles of impeachment.  The trial was aborted when certain bank records 
(to prove illicit payoffs) were suppressed.  Within hours, the next EDSA uprising emerged, 
and in a few days, civil society groups, aided by the military, succeeded in ousting Erap. 
The groundswell of public indignation was triggered by the suppression of evidence 
during the trial (i.e., the sealed envelope of banking records alleged to be Erap’s).  That 
same evening, mass protests erupted in Manila, and the next day, the impeachment trial was 
aborted.  The day after, the military chiefs would “withdraw their support” from the 
President.  On the fifth day of protests, a Saturday, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, who 
had earned public respect when he chaired the impeachment trial, swore in Vice-President 
Gloria Arroyo as the new President. Internationally, it was derided as “Rich People’s 
Power”, referring to the elite and middle-class composition of the protesting groups, a 
reminder of a venerable statesman’s warning about the perils of “political ventriloquism.” 
Locally, it was hailed as the triumph of democracy. 
 
3. The constitutionality of Arroyo’s presidency was challenged before the Supreme 
Court.   Yet the desperate measure, i.e., her oath-taking, was explained by the failure of 
legal and institutional processes. 
The oath-taking of Arroyo was challenged before the Supreme Court.  She, as vice-
president, could have assumed the Presidency only in case of the Erap’s death, disability, 
resignation, or impeachment.  None of these conditions had arisen.  Erap was still alive and 
able to perform his functions.  He had not been impeached, because precisely his 
impeachment trial had been aborted.  And he had not resigned.  Indeed there was no 
resignation letter, and contemporaneous televised statements by both the Chief Justice and 
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President Arroyo indicated their own misgivings.  In that context, the military’s 
“withdrawal of support” from Erap was in effect a mutiny against the President and 
Commander-in-Chief, violating the fundamental precepts of “civilian supremacy” and 
military non-intervention in politics.  Finally, the Supreme Court had lent its legitimizing 
power to Arroyo’s presidency when the Chief Justice administered her oath, attended by 
several Justices, performing an administrative act (as indeed technically it was) and while 
so properly (and expressly) reserving the option to rule on any subsequent judicial 
challenge.30 
 
Established interpretations of EDSA 2 portray it as the affirmation of the principle 
that no man is above the law, not even the President.  Yet that was accomplished only by 
taking constitutional short-cuts, and later asking the Supreme Court to go out on a limb to 
lend it legitimacy. On the other hand, the “extra-constitutionality” of desperate measures 
was justified by the failure of legal and institutional processes, and Erap’s ouster, though 
barely satisfying constitutional process, actually upheld the most deeply held norm that 
public office is a public trust. 
 
VI. Reconciling EDSA 2 with Constitutional Traditions 
Should [the Supreme Court] choose a literal and narrow view of the constitution, 
invoke the rule of strict law, and exercise its characteristic reticence?  Or was it 
propitious for it to itself take a hand?  ….  Paradoxically, the first option would 
almost certainly imperil the Constitution, the second could save it. (Vitug, J., 
separate opinion, Joseph Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 31 ) (emphases 
supplied) 
 
Thus the Court resolved the dilemma first confronted by the hero Apolinario Mabini, 
legal architect of the first Revolutionary Government which followed our independence 
from Spain, who, having seen forebodings of the Philippine-American War, said, “Drown 
                                                 
30 A.M. [Administrative Matter] No. 01-1-05-SC, In re: Request of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice (22 January 
2001). 
31 G.R. Nos. 146738 (2 March 2001); Joseph E. Estrada v. Aniano Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 (2 March 
2001). 
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the Constitution but save the principles.”  This was not the first time that the Court 
confronted the persistent dilemma between popular democracy and the rule of law. 
 
The first time was when the Court validated the Marcos Constitution in Javellana, 
saying that a constitution can be ratified by the people on their own, not necessarily through 
the strict modes expressly laid down in the Constitution.  
 
 The second time, ironically, was when the Court validated Cory’s presidency in the 
Freedom Constitution cases, recognizing that she had come to power in defiance of the 
existing Constitution and through the direct mandate of the people. 
 
 The third time was with the PIRMA cases, where the Court abandoned what Justice 
Vitug would later call its “characteristic reticence” and openly recognized what viscerally 
we knew to be one man’s ambition cloaked in “sanctimonious populist garb”, but were 
intellectually constrained to call a “peoples’ initiative.” 
 
 The fourth time was with the EDSA 2 case, where the Court truly cast off its 
“reticence” about what the sociologist Randolph David refers to as “the dark side of people 
power”, while intellectually maintaining the test of strict legality (in the main opinion) and 
a virtual “political question” (in many of the concurring opinions). 
 
In Joseph Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo32 , the Supreme Court declared 
Arroyo as the legitimate President, taking the path of strict doctrinal interpretation of the 
text of the Constitution. One, the Court could have taken the path of least resistance and 
declared the matter a political question and outside the scope of judicial review, exactly the 
way the Court disposed of judicial challenges to the legitimacy of Cory Aquino’s 
government and, before that, to Marcos’s martial law government.  Or, two, the Court could 
have also institutionalized People Power unabashedly as a mode of changing Presidents, 
and rather elastically interpreted the Constitution to mean that Erap was “incapacited”, not 
                                                 
32 Supra. 
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by sickness but by induced political paralysis through “withdrawal of support” by various 
centers of power in government, including the military, and by civil society.  Instead, three, 
the Court took the most careful legal path, declared the matter justiceable and found that 
Arroyo’s oath-taking was squarely covered by the Constitution. 
 
The Court rejected the first path, i.e., the political question doctrine, arguing that 
Arroyo assumed office under the present Constitution – under which she alone, and none of 
the other contenders, had the right of presidential succession – in contrast to Cory Aquino 
who candidly declared the revolutionary and extra-constitutional character of her 
assumption into power.  The legitimacy of Arroyo’s government thus required the 
resignation of Erap.  Neither did the Court take on the second path, which would have 
thrown the gates wide open to extra-constitutional transitions.  Instead, the Court insisted 
on the disciplined analysis of hard doctrine, as if EDSA 2 was not unusual at all and fit so 
snugly into the existing constitutional framework, and found that the “totality of prior, 
contemporaneous and posterior facts and … evidence” show an intent to resign coupled 
with actual acts of relinquishing the office. 
 
What is significant is that while all the participating justices upheld the validity of 
the Arroyo government, almost all of them spoke persistently about the possible excesses 
flowing from People Power – about opening the “floodgates” of the raw power of the 
people – while acutely aware of the imperatives of democratic governance. A justice asked:  
“Where does one draw the line between the rule of law and the rule of the mob, or between 
People Power and Anarchy?”, calling  for “great sobriety and extreme circumspection.”  
Each Supreme Court justice, in his turn, echoed this concern.  One justice cautioned the 
“hooting throng” that “rights in a democracy” should not be hostage to the “impatient 
vehemence of the majority.”  Another spoke of the “innate perils of people power.”  
Another asked how many “irate citizens” it takes to constitute People Power, and whether 
such direct action by the people can oust elected officials in violation of the Constitution.   
Finally, another justice expressed “disquietude [that] the use of ‘people power’ [“an 
amorphous … concept”] to create a vacancy in the presidency” can very well “encourag[e] 
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People Power Three, People Power Four, and People Power ad infinitum.” In that light, the 
Supreme Court was unanimous only “in the result”, i.e., in the conclusion that Arroyo’s 
oath-taking was valid, but not in the reasoning, which for the majority resembled that of the 
political question doctrine.  
 
VII. The State of Philippine Constitutional Discourse 
 There is a weakening of the ideal of constitutionalism itself.  Our original 1935 
constitution was a virtual copy of the U.S. constitution, which has been described as “A 
Machine That Would Go of Itself”33, a self-contained system of checks and balances that 
would enable government, first, to control the governed, and next, to control itself.  That 
ideal is imperiled in the Philippines. 
 
Erap’s impeachment trial was to be the showcase for the “hardening” of the “soft 
state” – the “single most salient characteristic” of Philippine governance – as the final act 
of “democratic consolidation”34.  “He who the sword of heaven will bear, Should be as holy 
as severe.”  Yet in the end Erap was removed only by cutting constitutional corners, 
ratifying in the courts the triumph won in the streets, “anointing power with piety.”  All 
over the country, the rule of law ideal was caricatured as “legal gobbledygook”, 
constitutional precepts, as a passing inconvenience.  What is so sacred about the 
Constitution anyway, people seemed to ask, why don’t we just hound him out of the 
Presidential Palace?  But constitutionalism says that we must insulate certain claims, 
certain values, from political bargaining, from the passions of the moment, from the 
hegemony of popular biases.  It places certain things above “ordinary” politics, that is to 
say, the day-to-day parliamentary give-and-take among elected representatives, deputies we 
can vote out in three-year cycles 
But, in doing so, critics say, constitutionalism takes politics away from the people, it 
distrusts the raw power of the masses, and would rather channel this energy toward 
government offices – directly elected representatives and appointed judges – farther and 
                                                 
33  Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself” (1993). 
34 Abueva, supra, at 61-62. 
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farther away from the people.  As Harvard Law Professor Richard Parker says, yes, we 
have a Constitution but there is no constitutionalism.  And he concludes: “Here, the people 
rule.”35 
 
 Finally, “People power” is constitutionally awkward precisely because it is peaceful 
and relies upon the moral power of an indignant citizenry. As recognized by the Javellana 
court, the political question doctrine may have been more easily applied had the change of 
constitutions been done by force of arms. “Treason doth never prosper, for if it prosper, 
none dare call it treason.”  Why make it any less acceptable that it was done by a mere 
show of hands?  The People Power cases before the Supreme Court demonstrate amply the 
full range of constitutional principles to foster non-recourse to violence, without rewarding 
extra-constitutional temptations. 
 
Conclusion 
Democracy is the solved riddle of all constitutions.  Here not merely 
implicitly and in essence but existing in reality, the constitution is constantly 
brought back to its actual basis, the actual human being, the actual people, 
and established as the people’s own work.36 
 
The Philippines’ post-Marcos constitutional order aimed at two competing goals: 
one, to restore the primacy of the rule of law – “a government of laws and not of men”37 – 
while two, institutionalizing the gains of “People Power” – the direct but peaceful exercise 
of democracy that ousted the Marcos regime. Looking at liberal democracy as being more 
than just free elections but as the search for a common basis of legitimacy for competing 
interests and values38, I look at the tension between rule-based governance through periodic 
elections and representative institutions vis-à-vis mass-based politics which by-passes 
formal processes.    
                                                 
35 RICHARD PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A POPULIST MANIFESTO (Harvard, 1996). 
36  Karl Marx, as cited in SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 149 (2000) (emphases in the original). 
37 Abueva, supra, at 21. 
38 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia Univ. Press, 1993). 
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EDSA 2 presented a stark setting for the counter-majoritarian dilemma.  On one 
hand, the ideal of strict legalism, the separation of powers and the built-in checks-and-
balances, the constitution as “A Machine That Would Go of Itself” and, on the other, the 
rawness of the people’s power, the romanticism of popular democracy, the readiness to 
look at social outcomes, not constitutional norms; to choose viscerally but speak 
legalistically, to look at interests and pretend to see only principles.  All these, in an Asian 
setting where liberal constitutionalism is a Western import39, indeed a colonial imposition, 
and law is several layers estranged from life; where democratic institutions are veneered 
over feudal alliances; where the state began, not organically from its milieu, but as the 
creature of the colonial power, and never embodied for the people their communal self.  
The public sphere commands no fealty, and is seen at best as merely the arena for pursuing 
private gain, and at worst, as easy prey for private spoliation. 
Thus we exalt democracy’s institutions and its rhetoric in grand scale, while we 
subvert its day-to-day workings in ad hoc compromises.  The challenge to Philippine 
constitutionalism is that it can work only by confessing that to be myth yet to do so is 
destroy itself. 
In contrasting Philippine democracy’s rituals from its substance, the debate between 
democracy and the rule of law must go beyond formal institutions, and inquire into our 
attitudes toward rules and institutions. What we formally debate (about laws, morals and 
principles) is rarely the real point of dispute (about interests and appetites).  We feel no 
duty to believe our formal arguments, and we lack the institutions and traditions that foster 
such belief.  We are liberals in law, tribal in life.  In our grand declarations we are free 
citizens in a republic but, in day-to-day life, a network of fiefdoms, where the rights-
bearing self is so wholly encumbered by allegiances to family and a web of kin-like 
obligations.   On paper, elections are a sacred rite of democracy, but in our hearts we listen 
elsewhere for the people’s voice.  We have debased democracy into ritual, and we are 
perplexed, now that we have tried it in practice, that it actually works, while our legal 
rhetoric lags behind. 
                                                 
39 But see Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism, The East Asian Challenge for Human 
Rights (Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999)., at 27 (the “inauthenticity of 
‘Asian values’”, in the purported clash between a stereotypical individualist West and communitarian Asia). 
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